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Failures in a Hybrid Content Blocking System

  • Richard Clayton
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3856)

Abstract

Three main methods of content blocking are used on the Internet: blocking routes to particular IP addresses, blocking specific URLs in a proxy cache or firewall, and providing invalid data for DNS lookups. The mechanisms have different accuracy / cost trade-offs. This paper examines a hybrid, two-stage system that redirects traffic that might need to be blocked to a proxy cache, which then takes the final decision. This promises an accurate system at a relatively low cost. A British ISP has deployed such a system to prevent access to child pornography. However, circumvention techniques can now be employed at both system stages to reduce effectiveness; there are risks from relying on DNS data supplied by the blocked sites; and unhappily, the system can be used as an oracle to determine what is being blocked. Experimental results show that it is straightforward to use the system to compile a list of illegal websites.

Keywords

Content Provider Child Pornography Proxy Cache Content Blocking Illegal Content 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Richard Clayton
    • 1
  1. 1.Computer LaboratoryUniversity of CambridgeCambridgeUnited Kingdom

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