Privacy Issues in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks

  • Florian Dötzer
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3856)


Vehicular Ad hoc NETworks (VANETs) demand a thorough investigation of privacy related issues. On one hand, users of such networks have to be prevented from misuse of their private data by authorities, from location profiling and from other attacks on their privacy. On the other hand, system operators and car manufacturers have to be able to identify malfunctioning units for sake of system availability and security. These requirements demand an architecture that can really manage privacy instead of either providing full anonymity or no privacy at all. In this paper we give an overview on the privacy issues in vehicular ad hoc networks from a car manufacturer’s perspective and introduce an exemplary approach to overcome these issues.


Mobile Node Smart Card Signature Scheme Privacy Issue Identity Base Encryption 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Florian Dötzer
    • 1
  1. 1.BMW Group Research and TechnologyMunichGermany

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