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On the Security of the Authentication Module of Chinese WLAN Standard Implementation Plan

  • Xinghua Li
  • SangJae Moon
  • Jianfeng Ma
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3989)

Abstract

Compared with the original standard, the greatest change that WAPI (Chinese WLAN security standard) implementation plan made lies in the key-agreement protocol in WAI (Wireless Authentication Infrastructure). This contribution presents a security analysis of the WAI module in the implementation plan with the Canetti-Krawczyk (CK) model. The results indicate that if the elliptic curve encryption scheme ECES adopted is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (CCA2 attack), then its key-agreement protocol is secure in the CK model, and it realizes the mutual identity authentication between STA (station) and AP (access point).

Keywords

Medium Access Control Implementation Plan Message Authentication Code Medium Access Control Address Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Xinghua Li
    • 1
    • 2
  • SangJae Moon
    • 2
  • Jianfeng Ma
    • 1
    • 3
  1. 1.Key Laboratory of Computer Networks and Information, Security (Ministry of Education)Xidian UniversityXi’anChina
  2. 2.Mobile Network Security Technology Research CenterKyungpook National UniversitySankyuk-dong, Buk-ku, DaeguKorea
  3. 3.School of Computing and AutomatizationTianjin Polytechnic UniversityTianjinChina

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