Developing Provable Secure M-Commerce Applications

  • Holger Grandy
  • Dominik Haneberg
  • Wolfgang Reif
  • Kurt Stenzel
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3995)


We present a modeling framework and a verification technique for m-commerce applications. Our approach supports the development of secure communication protocols for such applications as well as the refinement of the abstract protocol descriptions into executable Java code without any gap. The technique is explained using an interesting m-commerce application, an electronic ticketing system for cinema tickets. The verification has been done with KIV [BRS + 00].


Mobile Phone Security Protocol Security Property Proof Obligation Symbolic Execution 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Holger Grandy
    • 1
  • Dominik Haneberg
    • 1
  • Wolfgang Reif
    • 1
  • Kurt Stenzel
    • 1
  1. 1.Lehrstuhl für Softwaretechnik und Programmiersprachen, Institut für InformatikUniversität AugsburgAugsburgGermany

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