Language Modeling and Encryption on Packet Switched Networks

  • Kevin S. McCurley
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4004)


The holy grail of a mathematical model of secure encryption is to devise a model that is both faithful in its description of the real world, and yet admits a construction for an encryption system that fulfills a meaningful definition of security against a realistic adversary. While enormous progress has been made during the last 60 years toward this goal, existing models of security still overlook features that are closely related to the fundamental nature of communication. As a result there is substantial doubt in this author’s mind as to whether there is any reasonable definition of “secure encryption” on the Internet.


Language Modeling Semantic Meaning Encryption System Message Space Bell System Technical Journal 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Kevin S. McCurley
    • 1
  1. 1.GoogleUSA

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