Composition Implies Adaptive Security in Minicrypt

  • Krzysztof Pietrzak
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4004)


To prove that a secure key-agreement protocol exists one must at least show PNP. Moreover any proof that the sequential composition of two non-adaptively secure pseudorandom functions is secure against at least two adaptive queries must falsify the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption, a standard assumption from public-key cryptography. Hence proving any of this two seemingly unrelated statements would require a significant breakthrough. We show that at least one of the two statements is true.

To our knowledge this gives the first positive cryptographic result (namely that composition implies some weak adaptive security) which holds in Minicrypt, but not in Cryptomania, i.e. under the assumption that one-way functions exist, but public-key cryptography does not.


Sequential Composition Security Parameter Oblivious Transfer Pseudorandom Function Random Coin 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Krzysztof Pietrzak
    • 1
  1. 1.Département d’informatique, Ecole Normale SupérieureParisFrance

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