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Social Connections and Access Charges in Networks

  • Rodrigo Harrison
  • Gonzalo Hernandez
  • Roberto Munoz
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3993)

Abstract

In this paper we present a model where two interconnected network operators compete in linear prices in a market characterized by the existence of social connections among consumers, which are represented by a random regular graph. Assuming horizontal differentiation among operators, the customers select their network provider based on their preferences and the prices offered by the competing firms. In equilibrium the number of calls made to other agents depends on where they are located in the social network.

Keywords

Social Network Consumer Surplus Social Connection Access Price Access Charge 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Rodrigo Harrison
    • 1
  • Gonzalo Hernandez
    • 2
  • Roberto Munoz
    • 3
  1. 1.Instituto de EconomiaP.U.C. de Chile 
  2. 2.Escuela de Ingenieria Civil and U. de Chile, Centro de Modelamiento MatematicoUNAB 
  3. 3.Departamento de IndustriasCIDE Mexico, Division de Economia and U.T.F.S.M. Chile 

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