A Distributed Branch-and-Bound Algorithm for Computing Optimal Coalition Structures
Coalition formation is an important area of research in multi-agent systems. Computing optimal coalition structures for a large number of agents is an important problem in coalition formation but has received little attention in the literature. Previous studies assume that each coalition value is known a priori. This assumption is impractical in real world settings. Furthermore, the problem of finding coalition values become intractable for even a relatively small number of agents. This work proposes a distributed branch-and-bound algorithm for computing optimal coalition structures in linear production domain, where each coalition value is not known a priori. The common goal of the agents is to maximize the system’s profit. In our algorithm, agents perform two tasks: i) deliberate profitable coalitions, and ii) cooperatively compute optimal coalition structures. We show that our algorithm outperforms exhaustive search in generating optimal coalition structure in terms of elapses time and number of coalition structures generated.
KeywordsExhaustive Search Multiagent System Coalition Formation Coalition Structure Ranking Tree
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- 1.Neumann, J.V., Morgenstern, O.: Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey (1953) (printing, 1963)Google Scholar
- 3.Sandholm, T., Larson, K., Andersson, M., Shehory, O., Tohm, F.: Worst-case-optimal anytime coalition structure generation. In: Proceedings of AAAI 1998, pp. 46–53 (1998)Google Scholar
- 5.Dang, V.D., Jennings, N.R.: Generating coalition structures with finite bound from the optimal guarantees. In: Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2004, vol. 2, pp. 564–571 (2004) Google Scholar
- 8.Sombattheera, C., Ghose, A.: A distributed algorithm for coalition formation in linear production domain. In: Proceedings of ICEIS 2006(2006)Google Scholar
- 9.Shehory, O., Kraus, S.: Task allocation via coalition formation among autonomous agents. In: Proc. of IJCAI, pp. 655–661 (1995)Google Scholar
- 10.Shehory, O., Kraus, S.: Formation of overlapping coalitions for precedence-ordered task-execution among autonomous agents. In: ICMAS 1996, pp. 330–337 (1996)Google Scholar
- 11.Sandholm, T., Lesser, V.: Coalition Formation among Bounded Rational Agents. In: 14th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pp. 662–669 (1995)Google Scholar