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Pricing Web Services

  • Kevin Ho
  • John Sum
  • Gilbert S. Young
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3947)

Abstract

In this paper, a preliminary survey on the utilization of combinatorial auction as a mechanism for the allocation and the Gomory-Baumol price and the Shapley value as a pricing mechanism for web services is presented. It is shown that Gomory-Baumol price is in general unable to determine the prices for the individual service, even though the services can be optimally allocated. Except when the solution of the allocation problem is integral, the condition for which the Gomory-Baumol price could be determined is unclear. On the other hand, it is found that Shapley value could be applied to price individual service. By allowing the service providers setting reserve prices on their services, it can guarantee that the price is individual rational.

Keywords

Reserve Price Shadow Price Unit Price Combinatorial Auction Trading Service 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Kevin Ho
    • 1
  • John Sum
    • 1
  • Gilbert S. Young
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Information ManagementChung Shan Medical UniversityTaichungTaiwan, ROC
  2. 2.Department of Computer ScienceCal State Poly PomonaUSA

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