A Vickrey-Type Multi-attribute Auction Model

  • Xiang Chen
  • Shan-li Hu
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3930)


Internet auction is not only an integral part of Electronic Commerce but is also becoming a promising field for applying autonomous agents and multi-agent system (MAS) technologies. And auction, as an efficient resource allocation method, has an important role in MAS problems and as such is receiving increasing attention from scholars. This paper suggests a protocol (VAMA) and strategies for multi-attribute auction. Some useful properties such as strategy-proof are also proven. This paper also includes an analysis of the strategy of the buyer, and gives a decentralized mechanism for VAMA implementation as well as discussing some questions about VAMA. Finally, this protocol is compared with existing ones, improving on the work of Esther David etc.


Multiagent System Dominant Strategy Striking Price Combinatorial Auction English Auction 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Xiang Chen
    • 1
    • 2
  • Shan-li Hu
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Computer Science and TechonolyFuzhou UniversityFuzhouChina
  2. 2.Laboratory of Computer Science, Institute of SoftwareChinese Academy of SciencesBejingChina

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