Choose Your Tribe! – Evolution at the Next Level in a Peer-to-Peer Network

  • David Hales
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3910)


Many peer-to-peer (P2P) applications benefit from node speciali-sation. For example, the use of supernodes, the semantic clustering of media files or the distribution of different computing tasks among nodes. We describe simulation experiments with a simple selfish re-wiring protocol (SLAC) that can spontaneously self-organise networks into internally specialized groups (or “tribes”). Peers within the tribes altruistically pool their specialisms, sharing tasks and working altruistically as a team – or “tribe”. This approach is scalable, robust and self-organising. These results have implications and applications in many disciplines and areas beyond P2P systems.


Malicious Node Selfish Node Task Domain Skill Type Semantic Cluster 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • David Hales
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of BolognaItaly

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