Formal Interpretation and Analysis of Collective Intelligence as Individual Intelligence

  • Tibor Bosse
  • Jan Treur
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3891)


This paper addresses the question to what extent a process involving multiple agents that shows some form of collective intelligence can be interpreted as a single agent. The question is answered by formal analysis. It is shown for an example process how it can be conceptualised, formalised and simulated in two different manners: from a single agent (or cognitive) and from a multi-agent (or social) perspective. Moreover, it is shown how an ontological mapping can be formally defined between the two formalisations, and how this mapping can be extended to a mapping of dynamic properties. Thus it is shown how collective behaviour can be interpreted in a formal manner as single agent behaviour.


Single Agent Collective Intelligence Ontological Mapping Interpretation Mapping Extended Mind 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Tibor Bosse
    • 1
  • Jan Treur
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Artificial IntelligenceVrije Universiteit AmsterdamAmsterdamThe Netherlands

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