Tax Compliance in a Simulated Heterogeneous Multi-agent Society

  • Luis Antunes
  • João Balsa
  • Paulo Urbano
  • Luis Moniz
  • Catarina Roseta-Palma
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3891)


We consider an individualised approach to agent behaviour in an application to the classical economic problem of tax compliance. Most economic theories consider homogeneous representative agent utilitarian approaches to explain the decision of complying or not with tax payment. However, a heterogeneous and individualised account of decision can be considered to explain certain apparently irrational behaviours. Ideas such as trust and peer perception may have a key influence in individual decisions, and thus transform the global results for society. In this paper, we apply the agent view of rationality to economic decisions and define a territory to be explored by agent technology and social simulations. We conclude that the multi-agent view can provide powerful results which might lead to significant economic policy implications.


Public Good Public Choice Multiagent System Central Authority Shadow Economy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Luis Antunes
    • 1
  • João Balsa
    • 1
  • Paulo Urbano
    • 2
  • Luis Moniz
    • 2
  • Catarina Roseta-Palma
    • 3
  1. 1.GUESS/LabMAg/Universidade de LisboaPortugal
  2. 2.LabMAg/Universidade de LisboaPortugal
  3. 3.GUESS/Dinâmia/ISCTELisboaPortugal

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