Modeling Non-linear Common-Pool Resource Experiments with Boundedly Rational Agents

  • Eva Ebenhöh
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3891)


This paper presents a model of non-linear common-pool resource experiments with boundedly rational agents. The model is based on data of experiments with and without communication and reproduces individual and not only aggregated data. It is part of a framework for modeling economic experiments. The agents exhibit bounded rationality in the sense that they use simple heuristics and simple learning processes in an aspiration adaptation process, and base their decisions on norms and “’emotions”. A major objective of this kind of modeling is to implement agents in a way that makes it possible for humans to identify with agent behaviour.


Agent Behaviour Aspiration Level Social Dilemma Total Investment Inequality Aversion 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Eva Ebenhöh
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute of Environmental Systems ResearchUniversity of OsnabrückGermany

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