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New Observation on Camellia

  • Duo Lei
  • Li Chao
  • Keqin Feng
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3897)

Abstract

In this paper, some observations on Camellia are presented, by which the Square attack and the Collision attack are improved. 11-round 256-bit Camellia without FL function is breakable with complexity of 2250 encryptions. 9-round 128-bit Camellia without FL function is breakable with the complexity of 290 encryptions. And 10-round 256-bit Camellia with FL function is breakable with the complexity of 2210 encryptions and 9-round 128-bit Camellia with FL function is breakable with the complexity of 2122 encryptions. These results are better than any other known results. It concludes that the most efficient attack on Camellia is Square attack.

Keywords

Block Cipher Advance Encryption Standard Round Function Collision Attack Figure Illustration 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Duo Lei
    • 1
  • Li Chao
    • 1
  • Keqin Feng
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of ScienceNational University of Defense TechnologyChangshaChina
  2. 2.Department of MathTsinghua UniversityBeijingChina

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