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Symbolic and Cryptographic Analysis of the Secure WS-ReliableMessaging Scenario

  • Michael Backes
  • Sebastian Mödersheim
  • Birgit Pfitzmann
  • Luca Viganò
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3921)

Abstract

Web services are an important series of industry standards for adding semantics to web-based and XML-based communication, in particular among enterprises. Like the entire series, the security standards and proposals are highly modular. Combinations of several standards are put together for testing as interoperability scenarios, and these scenarios are likely to evolve into industry best practices. In the terminology of security research, the interoperability scenarios correspond to security protocols. Hence, it is desirable to analyze them for security. In this paper, we analyze the security of the new Secure WS-ReliableMessaging Scenario, the first scenario to combine security elements with elements of another quality-of-service standard. We do this both symbolically and cryptographically. The results of both analyses are positive. The discussion of actual cryptographic primitives of web services security is a novelty of independent interest in this paper.

Keywords

Security Protocol Security Property Simple Object Access Protocol Symmetric Encryption Cryptographic Primitive 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michael Backes
    • 1
  • Sebastian Mödersheim
    • 2
  • Birgit Pfitzmann
    • 1
  • Luca Viganò
    • 2
  1. 1.IBM Zurich Research LabSwitzerland
  2. 2.Information Security GroupETH ZurichSwitzerland

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