Design and Implementation of an Extended Reference Monitor for Trusted Operating Systems

  • Hyung Chan Kim
  • Wook Shin
  • R. S. Ramakrishna
  • Kouichi Sakurai
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3903)


Conventional access control schemes have supported confidentiality and integrity acknowledging the necessary organizational security policy in operating systems. However, many runtime attacks in operating systems involve behavioral semantics, indicating that attacks should be seen as a sequence of access operations. Ironically these attacks are legitimate under any access control policy. This is due to the lack of behavioral dimension in security enforcement. We propose an extended reference monitor to include this dimension. Our method is based on safety property specification on system call sequences. The reference monitor checks the trace at runtime for behavior control in Linux operating system.


Access Control Security Policy Linear Temporal Logic Access Control Policy Super User 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hyung Chan Kim
    • 1
  • Wook Shin
    • 2
  • R. S. Ramakrishna
    • 1
  • Kouichi Sakurai
    • 3
  1. 1.Department of Information and CommunicationsGwangju Institute of Science and TechnologyGwangjuRep. of Korea
  2. 2.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of Illinois at Urbana-ChampaignUSA
  3. 3.Faculty of Computer Science and Communication EngineeringKyushu UniversityFukuokaJapan

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