Identity-Based Key Agreement with Unilateral Identity Privacy Using Pairings

  • Zhaohui Cheng
  • Liqun Chen
  • Richard Comley
  • Qiang Tang
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3903)

Abstract

In most of the existing identity-based key agreement schemes, it is usually assumed that either the communicated parties know each other’s identifier before the protocol starts or their identifiers are transferred along with the protocol messages. However, these schemes are not suitable for use in many real-world applications aimed to achieve unilateral identity privacy, which means that one communicating party does not want to expose his identifier to an outsider while his partner cannot know his identifier in advance. In this paper, we propose an efficient identity-based two-party key agreement scheme with unilateral identity privacy using pairing, and formally analyze its security in a modified Bellare- Rogaway key agreement security model.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Zhaohui Cheng
    • 1
  • Liqun Chen
    • 2
  • Richard Comley
    • 1
  • Qiang Tang
    • 3
  1. 1.School of Computing ScienceMiddlesex UniversityLondonUK
  2. 2.Hewlett-Packard LaboratoriesBristolUK
  3. 3.Information Security Group, Royal HollowayUniversity of LondonEgham, SurreyUK

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