Abstract
We address the problem of realizing concurrently composable secure computation without setup assumptions. While provably impossible in the UC framework of [Can01], Prabhakaran and Sahai had recently suggested a relaxed framework called generalized Environmental Security (gES) [PS04], as well as a restriction of it to a “client-server” setting based on monitored functionalities [PS05]. In these settings, the impossibility results do not apply, and they provide secure protocols relying on new non-standard assumptions regarding the existence of hash functions with certain properties.
In this paper, we first provide gES protocols for general secure computation, based on a new, concrete number theoretic assumption called the relativized discrete log assumption (rDLA). Second, we provide secure protocols for functionalities in the (limited) client-server framework of [PS05], replacing their hash function assumption with the standard discrete log assumption. Both our results (like previous work) also use (standard) super-polynomially strong trapdoor permutations.
We believe this is an important step towards obtaining positive results for efficient secure computation in a concurrent environment based on well studied assumptions. Furthermore, the new assumption we put forward is of independent interest, and may prove useful for other cryptographic applications.
The original version of this chapter was revised: The copyright line was incorrect. This has been corrected. The Erratum to this chapter is available at DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-32732-5_32
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Malkin, T., Moriarty, R., Yakovenko, N. (2006). Generalized Environmental Security from Number Theoretic Assumptions. In: Halevi, S., Rabin, T. (eds) Theory of Cryptography. TCC 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3876. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11681878_18
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11681878_18
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