On the Quest for Impartiality: Design and Analysis of a Fair Non-repudiation Protocol

  • J. Cederquist
  • R. Corin
  • M. Torabi Dashti
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3783)


We design and analyze a simple optimistic fair non-repudia- tion protocol. Our protocol is considerably simpler and more efficient than current proposals, due mainly to the avoidance of using session labels. We model-check both safety and liveness properties. The safety properties are verified using a standard intruder, and the liveness properties using an intruder that respects the resilient communication channels assumption. Finally, to provide further confidence in the protocol, several vulnerabilities on weaker versions of our protocol are exposed.


Model Checker Safety Property Trusted Third Party Liveness Property Fair Exchange 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • J. Cederquist
    • 1
  • R. Corin
    • 1
  • M. Torabi Dashti
    • 2
  1. 1.University of Twente 
  2. 2.CWI Amsterdam 

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