Admissible Interference by Typing for Cryptographic Protocols

  • Alaaeddine Fellah
  • John Mullins
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3783)


Many security properties of cryptographic protocols can be expressed by using information flow policies as non-interference. But, in general it is very difficult to design a system without interference. For that, many works try to weak the standard definition of the non-interference. For instance, in [21] Mullins defines the admissible interference as an interference that admits flow information only through a dowgrader. Thus, we present in this paper a type system that try to detect process that allow interference. Then, if we can type a process we can say that is free interference. Also, we extend the type system of process with another type system based on a standard message algebra used in the literature of cryptographic protocols. So, we define the theoric characterization, prove the correctness of our type system and present an illustration of our result.


Admissible interference Type systems Process Algebra Cryptographic Protocols Security Properties 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alaaeddine Fellah
    • 1
  • John Mullins
    • 1
  1. 1.Département de génie informatiqueÉcole Polytechnique de MontréalMontréal (Québec)Canada

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