Bayesian Communication Leading to a Nash Equilibrium in Belief

  • Takashi Matsuhisa
  • Paul Strokan
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3828)


A Bayesian communication in the p-belief system is presented which leads to a Nash equilibrium of a strategic form game through messages as a Bayesian updating process. In the communication process each player predicts the other players’ actions under his/her private information with probability at least his/her belief. The players communicate privately their conjectures through message according to the communication graph, where each player receiving the message learns and revises his/her conjecture. The emphasis is on that both any topological assumptions on the communication graph and any common-knowledge assumptions on the structure of communication are not required.


p-Belief system Nash equilibrium Bayesian communication Protocol Conjecture Non-corporative game 

AMS 2000 Mathematics Subject Classification

Primary 91A35 Secondary 03B45 

Journal of Economic Literature Classification

C62 C78 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Takashi Matsuhisa
    • 1
  • Paul Strokan
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Natural SciencesIbaraki National College of TechnologyIbarakiJapan
  2. 2.Department of Applied Mathematics and Control ProcessesSaint-Petersburg State UniversitySaint-PetersburgRussia

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