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Enforcing Truthful Strategies in Incentive Compatible Reputation Mechanisms

  • Radu Jurca
  • Boi Faltings
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3828)

Abstract

We commonly use the experience of others when taking decisions. Reputation mechanisms aggregate in a formal way the feedback collected from peers and compute the reputation of products, services, or providers. The success of reputation mechanisms is however conditioned on obtaining true feedback. Side-payments (i.e. agents get paid for submitting feedback) can make honest reporting rational (i.e. Nash equilibrium). Unfortunately, known schemes also have other Nash equilibria that imply lying. In this paper we analyze the equilibria of two incentive-compatible reputation mechanisms and investigate how undesired equilibrium points can be eliminated by using trusted reports.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Equilibrium Strategy Service Failure Reporting Strategy Nash Equilibrium Strategy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Radu Jurca
    • 1
  • Boi Faltings
    • 1
  1. 1.Artificial Intelligence LaboratoryEcole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL)LausanneSwitzerland

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