Incentives in Some Coalition Formation Games

  • Gabrielle Demange
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3828)


The idea of using the core as a model for predicting the formation of coalitions and the sharing of benefits to coordinated activities has been studied extensively. Basic to the concept of the core is the idea of group rationality as embodied by the blocking condition. The predictions given by the core may run into difficulties if some individuals or coalitions may benefit from not blocking “truthfully”. This paper investigates this question in games in some games that generalize assignment games. Some positive results are given, and relationships with Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms are drawn.


Coalition Structure Assignment Game Balance Family Partition Property Large Coalition 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Gabrielle Demange
    • 1
  1. 1.Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences SocialesPSE (Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques)ParisFrance

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