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Atomic Selfish Routing in Networks: A Survey

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Internet and Network Economics (WINE 2005)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 3828))

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Abstract

In this survey we present some recent advances in the literature of atomic (mainly network) congestion games. The algorithmic questions that we are interested in have to do with the existence of pure Nash equilibria, the efficiency of their construction when they exist, as well as the gap of the best/worst (mixed in general) Nash equilibria from the social optima in such games, typically called the Price of Anarchy and the Price of Stability respectively.

This work is partially supported by the EU within 6th FP under contract 001907 (DELIS).

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Computer Science Department, University of Ioannina, 45110, Ioannina, Greece

    Spyros Kontogiannis

  2. Research Academic Computer Technology Institute, N. Kazantzakis Str., University Campus, 26500, Rio-Patra, Greece

    Spyros Kontogiannis & Paul Spirakis

Authors
  1. Spyros Kontogiannis
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  2. Paul Spirakis
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, City University of Hong Kong, Tat Chee Avenue, Kowloon ,, Hong Kong

    Xiaotie Deng

  2. Stanford University, Stanford, CA

    Yinyu Ye

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Kontogiannis, S., Spirakis, P. (2005). Atomic Selfish Routing in Networks: A Survey. In: Deng, X., Ye, Y. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3828. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11600930_100

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11600930_100

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-30900-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-32293-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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