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On Bluetooth Repairing: Key Agreement Based on Symmetric-Key Cryptography

  • Serge Vaudenay
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3822)

Abstract

Despite many good (secure) key agreement protocols based on public-key cryptography exist, secure associations between two wireless devices are often established using symmetric-key cryptography for cost reasons. The consequence is that common daily used security protocols such as Bluetooth pairing are insecure in the sense that an adversary can easily extract the main private key from the protocol communications. Nevertheless, we show that a feature in the Bluetooth standard provides a pragmatic and costless protocol that can eventually repair privateless associations, thanks to mobility. This proves (in the random oracle model) the pragmatic security of the Bluetooth pairing protocol when repairing is used.

Keywords

Authentication Protocol Random Oracle Commitment Scheme Random Oracle Model Test Query 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Serge Vaudenay
    • 1
  1. 1.EPFLLausanneSwitzerland

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