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Non-expanding Transaction Specific Pseudonymization for IP Traffic Monitoring

  • Conference paper

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNSC,volume 3810)

Abstract

This paper presents a scheme for transaction pseudonymization of IP address data in a distributed passive monitoring infrastructure. The approach provides high resistance against traffic analysis and injection attacks, and it provides a technique for gradual release of data through a key management scheme. The scheme is non-expanding, and it should be suitable for hardware implementations for high-bandwidth monitoring systems.

Keywords

  • Initialization Vector
  • Stream Cipher
  • Covert Channel
  • Injection Attack
  • Partial Disclosure

These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Øverlier, L., Brekne, T., Årnes, A. (2005). Non-expanding Transaction Specific Pseudonymization for IP Traffic Monitoring. In: Desmedt, Y.G., Wang, H., Mu, Y., Li, Y. (eds) Cryptology and Network Security. CANS 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3810. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11599371_22

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11599371_22

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-30849-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-32298-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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