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Towards a Market Mechanism for Airport Traffic Control

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Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNAI,volume 3808)

Abstract

We present a multiagent decision mechanism for the airport traffic control domain. It enables airlines to jointly decide on proposals for plan conflict solutions. The mechanism uses weighted voting for maximizing global utility and Clarke Tax to discourage manipulation. We introduce accounts to ensure that all agents are treated fairly, to some extent. The mechanism allows an airport to determine the pay-off between optimality and fairness of schedules. Also, it compensates for agents that happen to be in practically unfavourable positions.

Keywords

  • Pareto Front
  • Multiagent System
  • Market Mechanism
  • Weighted Vote
  • Combinatorial Auction

These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

This research is supported by the Technology Foundation STW, applied science division of NWO and the technology programme of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Project DIT5780: Distributed Model Based Diagnosis and Repair.

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© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Jonker, G., Meyer, JJ., Dignum, F. (2005). Towards a Market Mechanism for Airport Traffic Control. In: Bento, C., Cardoso, A., Dias, G. (eds) Progress in Artificial Intelligence. EPIA 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 3808. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11595014_50

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11595014_50

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-30737-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-31646-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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