Abstract
Non-interference is a desirable property of systems in a multilevel security architecture, stating that confidential information is not disclosed in public output. The challenge of studying information flow for assembly languages is that the control flow constructs that guide the analysis in high-level languages are not present. To address this problem, we define a typed assembly language that uses pseudo-instructions to impose a stack discipline on the control flow of programs. We develop a type system for checking that assembly programs enjoy non-interference and its proof of soundness.
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Medel, R., Compagnoni, A., Bonelli, E. (2005). A Typed Assembly Language for Non-interference. In: Coppo, M., Lodi, E., Pinna, G.M. (eds) Theoretical Computer Science. ICTCS 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3701. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11560586_29
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11560586_29
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