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A Taxonomy of Rational Attacks

  • Seth James Nielson
  • Scott A. Crosby
  • Dan S. Wallach
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3640)

Abstract

For peer-to-peer services to be effective, participating nodes must cooperate, but in most scenarios a node represents a self-interested party and cooperation can neither be expected nor enforced. A reasonable assumption is that a large fraction of p2p nodes are rational and will attempt to maximize their consumption of system resources while minimizing the use of their own. If such behavior violates system policy then it constitutes an attack. In this paper we identify and create a taxonomy for rational attacks and then identify corresponding solutions if they exist. The most effective solutions directly incentivize cooperative behavior, but when this is not feasible the common alternative is to incentivize evidence of cooperation instead.

Keywords

Rational Attack Malicious Node Rational Node Upload Bandwidth Audit Mechanism 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Seth James Nielson
    • 1
  • Scott A. Crosby
    • 1
  • Dan S. Wallach
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceRice University 

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