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Censorship Resistance Revisited

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Information Hiding (IH 2005)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 3727))

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Abstract

“Censorship resistant” systems attempt to prevent censors from imposing a particular distribution of content across a system. In this paper, we introduce a variation of censorship resistance (CR) that is resistant to selective filtering even by a censor who is able to inspect (but not alter) the internal contents and computations of each data server, excluding only the server’s private signature key. This models a service provided by operators who do not hide their identities from censors. Even with such a strong adversarial model, our definition states that CR is only achieved if the censor must disable the entire system to filter selected content. We show that existing censorship resistant systems fail to meet this definition; that Private Information Retrieval (PIR) is necessary, though not sufficient, to achieve our definition of CR; and that CR is achieved through a modification of PIR for which known implementations exist.

This research was supported in part by National Science Foundation Grant No. 0208853 and the NSF Graduate Research Fellowship.

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Perng, G., Reiter, M.K., Wang, C. (2005). Censorship Resistance Revisited. In: Barni, M., Herrera-Joancomartí, J., Katzenbeisser, S., Pérez-González, F. (eds) Information Hiding. IH 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3727. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11558859_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11558859_6

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-29039-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-31481-3

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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