A Practical Voting Scheme with Receipts

  • Marek Klonowski
  • Mirosław Kutyłowski
  • Anna Lauks
  • Filip Zagórski
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3650)


David Chaum introduced Visual Voting scheme in which a voter obtains a paper receipt from a voting machine. This receipt can be used to verify that his vote was counted in the final tally, but cannot be used for vote selling. The Chaum’s system requires sophisticated printers and application of randomized partial checking (RPC) method.

We propose a complete design of a voting system that preserves advantages of the Chaum’s scheme, but eliminates the use of special printers and RPC.


electronic voting receipt voting re–encryption mixnet anonymity 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Marek Klonowski
    • 1
  • Mirosław Kutyłowski
    • 1
  • Anna Lauks
    • 1
  • Filip Zagórski
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute of Mathematics and Computer ScienceWrocław University of Technology 

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