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Electronic Voting: Starting Over?

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Information Security (ISC 2005)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 3650))

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Abstract

We solve an 18 year open problem on e-voting. While most research on e-voting is focused on MIX servers, or on homomorphic encryption based schemes, or on blind signatures schemes, the issue raised by Cohen (Benaloh) is usually ignored. Cohen, using a trusted center, developed a yes/no voting scheme in which the outcome is revealed, keeping the tally private. In 1986, Benaloh and Yung posed as open problem how to do this without a trusted center.

In this paper, we generalize Cohen’s privacy concern in the context of yes/no voting. We allow multiple candidates or write-ins and multi-seat elections in which there is more than one seat to be filled by the election. We study how to announce the winner(s), without revealing the tally. We present schemes for such multi-seat elections satisfying the extra privacy constraint. Our schemes are based on proven secure primitives and do not need a trusted center.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dept. of Computer Science, University College, London, UK

    Yvo Desmedt

  2. Ibaraki University, Japan

    Kaoru Kurosawa

Authors
  1. Yvo Desmedt
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  2. Kaoru Kurosawa
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Cryptography and Security Department Institute for Infocomm Research, Singapore

    Jianying Zhou

  2. Department of Information and Communication Technologies, University of A Coruña, Spain

    Javier Lopez

  3. School of Information Systems, Singapore Management University, Singapore

    Robert H. Deng

  4. Institute for Infocomm Research, 119613, Singapore

    Feng Bao

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Desmedt, Y., Kurosawa, K. (2005). Electronic Voting: Starting Over?. In: Zhou, J., Lopez, J., Deng, R.H., Bao, F. (eds) Information Security. ISC 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3650. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11556992_24

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11556992_24

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-29001-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-31930-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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