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Hybrid Signcryption Schemes with Outsider Security

(Extended Abstract)
  • Alexander W. Dent
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3650)

Abstract

This paper expands the notion of a KEM–DEM hybrid encryption scheme to the signcryption setting by introducing the notion of a signcryption KEM, a signcryption DEM and a hybrid signcryption scheme. We present the security criteria that a signcryption KEM and DEM must satisfy in order that the overall signcryption scheme is secure against outsider attacks. We also present ECISS–KEM — a simple, efficient and provably secure example of a signcryption KEM. Lastly, we briefly discuss the problems associated with using KEMs in key establishment protocols.

Keywords

Security Parameter Security Criterion Signcryption Scheme Decryption Oracle Hybrid Encryption 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alexander W. Dent
    • 1
  1. 1.Information Security GroupRoyal Holloway, University of LondonEgham, SurreyU.K

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