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Specification and Validation of Authorisation Constraints Using UML and OCL

  • Karsten Sohr
  • Gail-Joon Ahn
  • Martin Gogolla
  • Lars Migge
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3679)

Abstract

Authorisation constraints can help the policy architect design and express higher-level security policies for organisations such as financial institutes or governmental agencies. Although the importance of constraints has been addressed in the literature, there does not exist a systematic way to validate and test authorisation constraints. In this paper, we attempt to specify non-temporal constraints and history-based constraints in Object Constraint Language (OCL) which is a constraint specification language of Unified Modeling Language (UML) and describe how we can facilitate the USE tool to validate and test such policies. We also discuss the issues of identification of conflicting constraints and missing constraints.

Keywords

Security Policy Object Constraint Language Policy Designer Access Control Policy Access Control Model 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Karsten Sohr
    • 1
  • Gail-Joon Ahn
    • 2
  • Martin Gogolla
    • 1
  • Lars Migge
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Mathematics and Computer ScienceUniversität BremenBremenGermany
  2. 2.Department of Software and Information SystemsUniversity of North Carolina at CharlotteCharlotteUSA

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