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Botnet Tracking: Exploring a Root-Cause Methodology to Prevent Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks

  • Felix C. Freiling
  • Thorsten Holz
  • Georg Wicherski
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3679)

Abstract

Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks pose a significant threat to the Internet today especially if they are distributed, i.e., launched simultaneously at a large number of systems. Reactive techniques that try to detect such an attack and throttle down malicious traffic prevail today but usually require an additional infrastructure to be really effective. In this paper we show that preventive mechanisms can be as effective with much less effort: We present an approach to (distributed) DoS attack prevention that is based on the observation that coordinated automated activity by many hosts needs a mechanism to remotely control them. To prevent such attacks, it is therefore possible to identify, infiltrate and analyze this remote control mechanism and to stop it in an automated fashion. We show that this method can be realized in the Internet by describing how we infiltrated and tracked IRC-based botnets which are the main DoS technology used by attackers today.

Keywords

Remote Control Intrusion Detection System Internet Relay Chat Remote Control Network IEEE Computer Security Foundation Workshop 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Felix C. Freiling
    • 1
  • Thorsten Holz
    • 1
  • Georg Wicherski
    • 1
  1. 1.Laboratory for Dependable Distributed SystemsRWTH Aachen University 

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