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International Conference on Cryptology in Malaysia

Mycrypt 2005: Progress in Cryptology – Mycrypt 2005 pp 183–195Cite as

Power Analysis by Exploiting Chosen Message and Internal Collisions – Vulnerability of Checking Mechanism for RSA-Decryption

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Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNSC,volume 3715)

Abstract

In this paper, we will point out a new side-channel vulnerability of cryptosystems implementation based on BRIP or square-multiply-always algorithm by exploiting specially chosen input message of order two. A recently published countermeasure, BRIP, against conventional simple power analysis (SPA) and differential power analysis (DPA) will be shown to be vulnerable to the proposed SPA in this paper. Another well known SPA countermeasure, the square-multiply-always algorithm, will also be shown to be vulnerable to this new attack. Further extension of the proposed attack is possible to develop more powerful attacks.

Keywords

  • Chosen-message attack
  • Cryptography
  • Side-channel attack
  • Simple power analysis (SPA)
  • Smart card

This work was supported by University IT Research Center Project.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Laboratory of Cryptography and Information Security (LCIS), Dept of Computer Science and Information Engineering, National Central University, Chung-Li, Taiwan, 320, R.O.C.

    Sung-Ming Yen & Wei-Chih Lien

  2. School of Electronic and Electrical Engineering, Kyungpook National University, Taegu, 702-701, Korea

    SangJae Moon

  3. Dept of Computer and Information, Korea Nazarene University, Choong Nam, 330-718, Korea

    JaeCheol Ha

Authors
  1. Sung-Ming Yen
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  2. Wei-Chih Lien
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  3. SangJae Moon
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  4. JaeCheol Ha
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Information Security Institute, Queensland University of Technology, GPO Box 2434, 4001, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia

    Ed Dawson

  2. EPFL, CH-1015, Lausanne, Switzerland

    Serge Vaudenay

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Yen, SM., Lien, WC., Moon, S., Ha, J. (2005). Power Analysis by Exploiting Chosen Message and Internal Collisions – Vulnerability of Checking Mechanism for RSA-Decryption. In: Dawson, E., Vaudenay, S. (eds) Progress in Cryptology – Mycrypt 2005. Mycrypt 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3715. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11554868_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11554868_13

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-28938-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-32066-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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