Resistance of Randomized Projective Coordinates Against Power Analysis

Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3659)


Embedded devices implementing cryptographic services are the result of a trade-off between cost, performance and security. Aside from flaws in the protocols and the algorithms used, one of the most serious threats against secret data stored in such devices is Side Channel Analysis.

Implementing Public Key Cryptography in low-profile devices such as smart cards is particularly challenging given the computational complexity of the operations involved. In the area of elliptic curve cryptography, some choices of curves and coefficient fields are known to speed up computations, like scalar multiplication. From a theoretical standpoint, the use of optimized structures does not seem to weaken the cryptosystems which use them. Therefore several standardization bodies, such as the NIST, recommend such choices of parameters. However, the study of their impact on practical security of implementations may have been underestimated.

In this paper, we present a new chosen-ciphertext Side-Channel Attack on scalar multiplication that applies when optimized parameters, like NIST curves, are used together with some classical anti-SPA and anti-DPA techniques. For a typical exponent size, the attack allows to recover a secret exponent by performing only a few hundred adaptive power measurements.


Elliptic Curve Smart Card Elliptic Curf Scalar Multiplication Secret Data 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.DCSSI Crypto LabPARIS 07 SP

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