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Regular Protocols and Attacks with Regular Knowledge

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Automated Deduction – CADE-20 (CADE 2005)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 3632))

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Abstract

We prove that, if the initial knowledge of the intruder is given by a deterministic bottom-up tree automaton, then the insecurity problem for cryptographic protocols with atomic keys for a bounded number of sessions is NP-complete. We prove also that if regural languages (given by tree automata) are used in protocol descriptions to restrict the form of messages, then the insecurity problem is NexpTime-complete.

Furthermore, we define a class of cryptographic protocols, called regular protocols, such that the knowledge which the intruder can gain during an unlimited number of sessions of a protocol is a regular language.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. LORIA-INRIA-Lorraine, France, Institute of Computer Science, Wrocław University, Poland

    Tomasz Truderung

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  1. Tomasz Truderung
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Technical University of Catalonia, Barcelona

    Robert Nieuwenhuis

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Truderung, T. (2005). Regular Protocols and Attacks with Regular Knowledge. In: Nieuwenhuis, R. (eds) Automated Deduction – CADE-20. CADE 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 3632. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11532231_28

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11532231_28

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-28005-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-31864-4

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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