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On the Anonymity of Banknotes

  • Dennis Kügler
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3424)

Abstract

In this paper we analyze the anonymity of banknote based payments. We show how to model intermediary-chains and present statistical methods that can be used by banks to extract information on the length of the chain from deposited banknotes. If the bank has discovered a chain of length zero, the anonymity of the payment is immediately revoked. To protect against such deanonymizations, customers have to be very careful when spending banknotes.

Keywords

Serial Number Optical Character Recognition Blind Signature Criminal Investigation Anonymous Communication 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dennis Kügler
    • 1
  1. 1.Federal Office for Information SecurityBonnGermany

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