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So how do you make a full ALARP justification? Introducing the Accident Tetrahedron as a guide for Approaching Completeness.

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Developments in Risk-based Approaches to Safety

Abstract

One of the fundamentals of safety engineering is the need not merely to achieve safety, but to demonstrate its achievement in advance [Redmill and Anderson 2005]. There are now a significant number of standards and taxonomies to follow in order to create a demonstration medium for indicating the level of achieved safety, the residual risks and how both are to be managed through the life of the system.

However, it is most difficult to obtain easy to use advice and tools for being able to demonstrate completely that risks are as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). It is accepted that each project’s handling of ALARP has to be specific to the particular project risks involved, and so bespoke guidance is not the objective of this text. This paper seeks to introduce a simple tool, well utilised and accepted in another safety field, but developed from a specific use into having generic scope that will be of useful value to safety practitioners looking for dedicated ALARP advice. The tool is called the Accident Tetrahedron.

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© 2006 Springer-Verlag London Limited

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Maguire, R. (2006). So how do you make a full ALARP justification? Introducing the Accident Tetrahedron as a guide for Approaching Completeness.. In: Redmill, F., Anderson, T. (eds) Developments in Risk-based Approaches to Safety. Springer, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/1-84628-447-3_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/1-84628-447-3_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, London

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-84628-333-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-84628-447-2

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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