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Handbook of Public Finance pp 19–51Cite as

Welfare Economics and Public Finance

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Abstract

This contribution deals firstly with the differences between market action and government action, and then explores the justification for government intervention based on concepts of economic efficiency and equity. The chapter then proceeds to discuss individual cases in which unregulated private market outcomes are generally considered to violate this criterion.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. West Virginia University, USA

    Russell S. Sobel

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  1. Russell S. Sobel
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Erfurt, Erfurt, Germany

    Jürgen G. Backhaus

  2. George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia, USA

    Richard E. Wagner

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Sobel, R.S. (2005). Welfare Economics and Public Finance. In: Backhaus, J.G., Wagner, R.E. (eds) Handbook of Public Finance. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-7864-1_2

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