The question chosen as title of this paper may strike the reader as peculiar. For it is often said that an operational definition of a concept is a definition in terms of operations of measurement. To be an operationist, many scientists would say, is to insist that scientific concepts be made precise and empirically applicable by defining them in terms of measuring operations. Does it not follow, then, that, if any concepts are operationally definable, then concepts of physical magnitudes are? However, the widely used term “operational definition” needs clarification. I shall specify in the course of this paper a sense in which such terms as “length,” “mass,” “temperature,” etc. are not operationally definable insofar as they enter into the mathematical formulation of physical laws; but I will also specify a sense in which they must be operationally definable if they are to have any physical significance.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2006 Springer
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
KEUPINK, A., SHIEH, S. (2006). ARE PHYSICAL MAGNITUDES OPERATIONALLY DEFINABLE? (1959). In: KEUPINK, A., SHIEH, S. (eds) THE LIMITS OF LOGICAL EMPIRICISM. SYNTHESE LIBRARY, vol 334. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-4299-X_23
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-4299-X_23
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-1-4020-4298-0
Online ISBN: 978-1-4020-4299-7
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)