A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for Its Own Sake

  • W. Rabinowicz
  • T. Rønnow-Rasmussen
Part of the Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy book series (LOET, volume 17)

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© Springer 2005

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  • W. Rabinowicz
  • T. Rønnow-Rasmussen

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