Keeping the Conversational Score: Constraints for an Optimal Contextualist Answer?

  • Verena Gottschling


Conversational contextualism states that the truth-conditions expressed by knowledge-attributing sentences vary relative to the context of utterance. This context is determined partly by different standards the person involved must meet in order to make the sentence true. I am concerned with the question of how these standards can be raised or lowered, and especially what happens to the standards and the conversational score when parties in a discussion push the conversational scores in different directions. None of the available options for an answer seems satisfying. I argue that this results from a misunderstanding of the characteristics of the situation at hand.


Knowledge Ascription Veto Power Personal Standard Epistemic Standard Conversational Contextualism 
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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Verena Gottschling
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of MainzMainzGermany

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