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A Different Sort of Contextualism

  • John Greco

Abstract

A number of virtue epistemologists endorse the following thesis: Knowledge is true belief resulting from intellectual virtue, where S’s true belief results from intellectual virtue just in case S believes the truth because S is intellectually virtuous. This thesis commits one to a sort of contextualism about knowledge attributions. This is because, in general, sentences of the form “X occurred because Y occurred” require a contextualist treatment. This sort of contextualism is contrasted with more familiar versions. It is argued that the position: (a) yields a better solution to the lottery problem, and (b) may be grounded in a more general theory of virtue and credit.

Keywords

True Belief Knowledge Claim Lottery Ticket Knowledge Attribution Intellectual Virtue 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • John Greco
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyFordham UniversityBronxUSA

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