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Emmanuel Levinas: Non-Intentional Consciousness and the Status of Representational Thinking

  • Roger Duncan
Part of the Analecta Husserliana book series (ANHU, volume 90)

Keywords

Husserlian Phenomenology Deep Time Intentional Consciousness Moral Rectitude John Wild 
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Notes

  1. 1.
    Cf. John Finnis, Fundamentals of Ethics (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1983), pp. 1–25.Google Scholar
  2. 3.
    Emmanuel Levinas, Is it Righteous to Be? Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2001) p. 32.Google Scholar
  3. 4.
    “Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), p. 27.Google Scholar
  4. 5.
    Ibid., p. 27.Google Scholar
  5. 6.
    Ibid., p. 28. In later works Levinas will avoid “forgotten experience” as too crudely implying appearance in a time that could be recuperated in memory. The deep time of capture by the other lies beyond the “light cone” of rememberable time.Google Scholar
  6. 7.
    Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1998), p. 48.Google Scholar
  7. 8.
    Ibid., p. 68.Google Scholar
  8. 9.
    Emmanuel Levinas, “Philosophy and Transcendence,” written in 1989, published in the Encyclopedie Philosophique Universelle, translated and reproduced in Alterity and Transcendence (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), p. 18. The notion of non-intentional consciousness is not unique to Levinas. Karol Wojtyla uses it where it would seem to be an implicit but important response to Sartre. Cf. Karol Wojtyla, The Acting Person, Andrezej Potocki (trans.), Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (ed.) (Boston: D. Reidel, 1979), p. 34.Google Scholar
  9. 10.
    Otherwise than Being, p. 9.Google Scholar
  10. 11.
    He uses the word actually in Otherwise than Being, p. 4.Google Scholar
  11. 12.
    Alterity and Transcendence, p. 22.Google Scholar
  12. 13.
    David Bentley Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite (Cambridge, U.K.: Eerdmans, 2003), pp. 14–15.Google Scholar
  13. 14.
    Otherwise than Being, p. 157.Google Scholar
  14. 15.
    Ibid., p. 158.Google Scholar
  15. 16.
    Ibid., p. 159.Google Scholar
  16. 17.
    Ibid., p. 6.Google Scholar
  17. 18.
    Ibid., p. 16.Google Scholar
  18. 19.
    Ibid., p. 162.Google Scholar
  19. 21.
    Otherwise than Being, p. 86.Google Scholar
  20. 22.
    Ibid., pp. 165–171.Google Scholar
  21. 23.
    Emmanuel Levinas, Entre Nous (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998) Preface, p. xii.Google Scholar
  22. 24.
    Otherwise than Being, p. 192, note 24.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Roger Duncan
    • 1
  1. 1.Promisek CenterBridgewater

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