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Phenomenological History and Phenomenological Historiography

Discerning the Temporal Structure of a Person’s “Lived Experience” and its Causal Role in One’s Logic of Events and Historical Conceptions
  • Mark E. Blum
Chapter
Part of the Analecta Husserliana book series (ANHU, volume 90)

Keywords

Noun Phrase Quantum Logic Pure Reason Count Noun Topic Sentence 
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Notes

  1. 1.
    Temporality in its qualitative variations are created in Kant’s epistemology by extensive magnitudes that “flow” (Critique of Pure Reason, Norman Kemp Smith (trans.) (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 204 (A 170, B 212). There are several texts between the 1890s and the 1930s that focus upon the process of inner temporality in Husserl. I list in the order of their publication, which specific references in the earlier texts to the sections: Edmund Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, Lothar Eley (ed.) (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), 34–35. Logical Investigations, J. N. Findlay (trans.), 2 vols. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), 2: 484ff. The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness, James S. Churchill (trans.) (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966). Die Bernauer Manuskripte über Das Zeitbewusstsein (1917/18) (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001). Experience and Judgment, Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic, James S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks (trans.) (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 164–165, 253–261. Further reference to these texts and editions.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Edm und Husserl uses the term “lived experience,” that is Das Erlebnis throughout his career of thought; see Logische Untersuchungen (1900), Zweiter Band: Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis (5th ed., Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1968), 347–353 [Investigation 5, Pars. 2–3].), and in English, Logical Investigations, 1970, 2: 536–541 [Investigation 5, Pars. 2–3]. His later use is documented in Experience and Judgment, 1973, 47–48 [Par. 11]. Wilhelm Dilthey’s use of the term in Introduction to the Human Sciences, An Attempt to Lay a Foundation for the Study of Society and History (1883), Ramon J. Betanzos (trans.) (Detroit: Wayne State University, 1988), especially pp. 94, 159. Dilthey’s first edition in 1883 also uses the term innere Erfahrung as he seeks to ground the concept of Das Erlebnis as an inner experiencing that conditions external pereception and experience. For Dilthey’s use of the term Erlebnis in his first edition, see Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften, Versuch einer Grundlegung für das Studium der Gesellschaft und Geschichte, Volume One (Leipzig, Duncker & Humblot, 1883), pp. 39, 170. Dilthey’s most extensive deliberation of the concept appears in Wilhelm Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Volume VI, 3rd ed. (Stuttgart: B.G. Teubner, 1958), 313ff. The differing, yet overlapping perspectives of Dilthey and Husserl of “lived experience” as inner temporal constitution were a subject of their mutual correspondence, and the further correspondence between Husserl with his students over the whole of his own career of thought. See Edmund Husserl Briefwechsel, 10 volumes (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994), especially Vol. 4 (p. 367), Vol. 6 (pp. 43–52), Vol. 3 (pp. 157–159, 457–465, 504–507, 516–517), Vol. 4 (pp. 247–249, 364–369, 376–379), Vol. 6 (pp. 274–284, 338–339, 428–430), and Vol. 7 (p. 222).Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    See Max Scheler, Problems of a Sociology of Knowledge, Manfred Frings (trans.) (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980).Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    See Mark E. Blum, Thinking historically in Germany and Austria from the Enlightenment to the Present: the Integration of Individual and National Historical Logics (Manuscript, Department of History, University of Louisville, 2004).Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Frege uses different equations, but the point is the same. See Frege’s letter to Bertrand Russell, December 28, 1902 in The Frege Reader, Michael Beaney (ed.) (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 255.Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    I paraphrase the citation. Wilhelm Dilthey, Poetry and Experience, Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi (eds.) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 229.Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    See F. E. Peters, Greek Philosophical Terms, A Historical Lexicon (New York: New York University Press, 1967), 34–36. Husserl uses this term indirectly to refer to the fundamental parts and wholes that cohere phenomena. In the passage where he introduces the term diaeresis he states: “What is it that is ‘bound together’ and’ separated’ in the judgment? Further: which among the multiple judgment-forms which tradition distinguishes is the most primitive, i.e., that one which, as being the undermost, and founding all others, must be presupposed, and by an essential necessity conceived as underlying, in order that other forms of a ‘higher level’ can be founded on it”; Edmund Husserl, Experience and Judgment, James S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks (trans.) (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 14. Husserl had answered that question in his early Logical Investigations. He discussed part and whole relationships as the foundational basis of logic, and therefore of all higher-order judgments. See Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, 1970, 2: 435.Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Husserl using Leibnizian language makes this point clearly in his Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, Lectures on Transcendental Logic, Anthony J. Steinbock (trans.) (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001), 635 [34], 637 [36], and 642 [39]. Further reference to this text and edition: See also Husserl’s Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution, Rikchard Rojcewicz and Andre Schuwer (trans.) (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), 289–290 on this understanding of monadic inviduation of experience. As I will argue, had Husserl been able to cooperate with Dilthey on studies of the grammatical stylistics of thinkers, both men would have offered each other increasing insight into the genesis of idea out of the inner temporal rhythms of pre-egological “lived experience.” This text will be refererred to in further references as Ideas II. Kant was chary of predeterminative functions of mind insofar as judgments that were necessarily individual and idiosyncratic. He termed this mistaken vision “preformation,” referring to Leibniz and others who seemed locked in the scholastic tradition of individuation. For Kant, the a priori was always chosen by the reflective judgment in its constitutive form. While Kant saw habits of mind in persons that had an individual style, he saw them as always self-chosen maxims. See Critique of Pure Reason, 1968, 174–175 [B 167–168], and 547–549 [A665–A668, B693–696].Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    At the beginning of this century William Stern, a psychologist well known to Husserl, theorized there was a personal teleology evident in the language expression of even one-or two-year-old children. See Lev Vygotsky, “Stern’s Theory of Language Development”, in Thought and Language, Eugenia Hanfmann and Gertrude Vakar (trans.) (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1962), 25–32. Stern’s studies into the individuation personal meaning and language are: William Stern, Person und Sache, Volume I (Leipzig: J. A. Barth, 1905), Psychologie der frühen Kindheit (Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer, 1914), and Die Kindersprache (Leipzig: J.A. Barth, 1928). Husserl mentions Stern as an influence in his own The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness (1905). See Edmund Husserl, Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness, James S. Churchill (trans.) (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966), 41. Stern’s article that Husserl cited was “Psychische Präsenzeit,” Zeitschrift für Psychologie, Vol. XIII (1897), 325–349 and the monograph Psychologie der Veränderungs auffassung (Breslau: Preuss und Jünger, 1898).Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    See Jonas Langer, The Origins of Logic, One to Two Years (Orlando, Fla.: Academic Press, 1986,), 16ff.Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    L. Bloom, Language Development: Form and Function in Emerging Grammars. Research monograph no. 59 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1970); L. Bloom, P. Lightbown, and L. Hood, Structure and Variation in Child Language. Monographs of the society for research in child development, 40, no. 2 (Chicago: Chicago University, 1975); L. Bloom and L. Hood, What, when, and how about why: a longitudinal study of early expressions of causality. Monographs of the society for research in child development, 44, no. 6 (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1979).Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    There are extensive discussions of the epigenetic relation of concept to intuitive ground in Husserl’s late work Formal and Transcendental Logic. See, for example, Appendix I, Par. 4 ‘Lower and Higher Forms. Their Sense-Relation to One Another; Formal and Transcendental Logic, Dorion Cairns (trans.) (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), 298–299).Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    Edmund Husserl, Experience and Judgment, Investigations into a Genealogy of Logic, 1973, 258–259 [Par. 64 c.]Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    See the exchange of correspondence between Frege and Russell on the issue of set theory in Gottlob Frege, Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence, Hans Kaal (trans.) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 152–166. Set theory relies upon ‘the manifold’, the diaeresis natural to Frege (and Kant) in contradistinction to the aggregate solution that eschews set theory, where separate whole entities have ashared meaning that is but a ‘ratio’ of connection. I discuss this at length in Mark E. Blum, Discerning the effects upon conceptual development of the profiles of the phases of “givenness-time”: the linguistic artefact as evidence of the constant influence of inner temporal constitution ujpon the genesis and articulation of eidos and essence (Manuscript, Department of History, University of Louisville, 2003), pp. 59–74.Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    Ulrich Melle, the editor of the Ergänzungsband (1913) of the Logischen Untersuchungen, a text that informs this question in Husserliana, emphasizes that Husserl saw language in one way or another central to how the perception in its temporal-spatial ground determines the genesis of higher level judgments that emerge from its basis. Melle as he comments upon Husserl’s reflections on whether language is somehow present in a perception in an “empty manner,” as a language-free form of thought “sprachlosen Denkungsform,” quotes Husserl’s reservations in that regard to the effect that the linguistic expression is not “like clothing that can be taken off and the thought then can be had as a naked thought in itself beside it;” Ulrich Melle, “Signitive und Signifakative Intentionen,” Husserl Studies 15 (1998), 180.Google Scholar
  16. 16.
    See Nelson Goodman for this logical distinction, The Structure of Appearance (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1951), 54 ff. See also Eli Hirsch, Essence and Identity in Identity and Individuation, Milton K. Munitz (ed.) (New York: New York University Press, 1971), 45. I have used this distinction to guide my own stylistic insights into grammatical preferences that divide aggregative and quantum thinkers.Google Scholar
  17. 17.
    Keith Feiling, The Life of Neville Chamberlain (London: Macmillan, 1947), 256.Google Scholar
  18. 18.
    Winston Churchill, While England Slept, A Survey of World Affairs 1932–1938 (New York: Putnam, 1938), 141.Google Scholar
  19. 19.
    See a discussion of the development of this concept over Dilthey’s career of thought in Rudolf A. Makkreel, Dilthey, Philosopher of the Human Studies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 72–73, 397–399.Google Scholar
  20. 20.
    G. R. Elton, England under the Tudors, 2nd ed. (London: Methuen, 1974), vii–viii.Google Scholar
  21. 21.
    Arthur Joseph Slavin, The Precarious Balance, English Government and Society 1460–1640 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973).Google Scholar
  22. 22.
    I use the symbolic expressions of “sentential connectives” of Rudolf Carnap, Introduction to Symbolic Logic and its Applications, William H. Meyer and John Wilkinson (trans.) (New York: Dover, 1958), 6–9.Google Scholar
  23. 23.
    For models of the correlation and juxtaposition of grammar with their symbolic value, see Norbert Hornstein, Logic as Grammar (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987), and a discussion of this method of notation in James D. McCawley, Everything that Linguists have Always Wanted to Know about Logic* *but were ashamed to ask (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 87ff. My orthography of symbolic analysis departs from the standard practice of assigning (x) — a bound variable, or f (x) — a free variable to the part or whole entities which are put into relation in the sentential judgment. The reason is that I am not interested in pursuing the semantic truth values of any state of affairs. I am only interested in showing the temporal structure created by the linkage of parts and wholes in the judgment. Reichenbach clarifies his use of ‘x’ as a quantifier or operator in this spirit of a semantic, i.e. qualitative emphasis: “For the operations called by us ‘binding variables’ the term ‘quantification’ is frequently used; operators then are called ‘quantifiers.’ We do not employ these terms because neither the all-statement nor the existential statement is a quantitative statement; they are qualitative statements” (Hans Reichenbach, Elements of Symbolic Logic (New York: Macmillan, 1947), 87, fn 1. As I am solely interested in how time is generated through the successive relations of parts to parts, parts to wholes, wholes to wholes, I will omit the operator in the orthography of my symbolic analysis. An “operator” or “quantifier” plays no role in the totality of quantitative relations that connect the extensive magnitudes of a sentential judgment, generating temporality, because in the attention to temporal genesis one agent or entity is not being tracked in its functions or properties. The sole interest is in how the event-structure is organized and its relation to temporal and historical conceptualization.Google Scholar
  24. 24.
    See Mark E. Blum, Continuity, Quantum, Continuum, and Dialectic: The Foundational Logics of Western Historical Thinking. (Manuscript, Department of History, University of Louisville, Louisville, Ky. 40292).Google Scholar
  25. 25.
    The symbol ‘⊃’ is’ succession’ as used, not ‘implication. Rudolf Carnap speaks of the “the weak conditional,” in his use of this sign. My use is even weaker in that ‘B’ is any action in a previous or later time that seems connected successively in the mind of the judger. See Carnap, Introduction to Symbolic Logic and Its Applications (New York, 1958), p. 8.Google Scholar
  26. 27.
    I employ Kant’s a priori categories that instill a modal manner of deliberation into a judgment. Kant’s three modalities of ‘the problematic,’ ‘the assertoric,’ and the ‘apodeictic,’ appear in my stylistic inquiries with a grammatical evidence that I discuss in depth elsewhere (see my Continuity, Quantum, Continuum, and Dialectic: The Foundational Logics of Historical Thinking, Chapter Five). Kant writes of the modalties in Critique of Pure Reason, 1968, 109–110 [A75–A76, B 100–101].Google Scholar
  27. 28.
    Edmund Husserl, “Die Geschichte der Philosophie im Konnex der Historischen Wissenschaft und der Kultur,” in Der Krisis der Europäischen Wissenschaften und die Transzendentale Phänomenologie, Ergänzungsband Texte Aus Dem Nachlass 1934–1937. Analecta Husserliana, Vol. XXIX (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1950), 57.Google Scholar
  28. 29.
    Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, David Carr (trans.) (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 15.Google Scholar
  29. 30.
    Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, Logos and Life, Impetus and Equipoise in the Life-Strategies of Reason, Logos and Life, Book 4 (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), 465, 466.Google Scholar

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© Springer 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mark E. Blum
    • 1
  1. 1.University of LouisvilleLouisville

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