Advertisement

The Vulnerable Body: Towards a Phenomenological Theory of Violence

  • Michael Staudigl
Part of the Analecta Husserliana book series (ANHU, volume 89)

Keywords

French Original Classical Phenomenology Innermost Core Theological Turn Vulnerable Body 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes

  1. 1.
    I borrow this formula from Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain. The Making and Unmaking of the World (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1987).Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    See Alfred Schutz and Thomas Luckmann, The Structures of the Life-world (Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1973), especially chapter II B. 5.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution (Husserliana IV) (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1952), p. 144ff.; Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Dritter Teil 1929–1935 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1973), pp. 295ff.Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Cf. Martin Schnell, “Die Phänomenologie und ihr Umfeld zur Frage der Gewalt,” Journal Phänomenologie 9 (1998): 2–6.Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    See the works of Dan Zahavi, especially Husserl und die transzendentale Intersubjektivität. Eine Antwort auf die sprachpragmatische Kritik (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996) and Self-awareness and Alterity. A Phenomenological Investigation (Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1999); and Anthony Steinbock, Home and Beyond. Generative Phenomenology after Husserl (Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1995). Both of them lucidly clarify the importance of these shifts for the further development of phenomenological research.Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Cf. Michel Henry, “Quatre principes de la phénoménologie,” Revue de Métaphysique et de morale 1 (1991): 3–26.Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Cf. Jean-Luc Marion, Reduction and Givenness. Investigations of Husserl, Heidegger, and Phenomenology, Thomas A. Carlson (trans.) (Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1998), p. 203 (French original: Réduction et donation. Recherches sur Husserl, Heidegger, et la phénoménologie, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1989, pp. 303–305).Google Scholar
  8. 9.
    I borrow this Hegelian phrase from Laszlo Tengelyi who magistrally unfolded its phenomenological implications in his “Vom Erlebnis zur Erfahrung. Phänomenologie im Umbruch,” in: Wolfgang Hogrebe (ed.), Grenzen und Grenzüberschreitungen (Berlin: Akademie 2004), pp. 788–800.Google Scholar
  9. 10.
    Cf. Michael Staudigl, “Gewalt als Thema und Problembestand der Phänomenologie,” in: Harun Maye and Hans Rainer Sepp (eds.), Phänomenologie und Gewalt (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann 2004).Google Scholar
  10. 11.
    See Rudolf Bernet, “The Traumatized Subject,” Research in Phenomenology, vol. XXX (2000), pp. 160–179.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. 12.
    See for this critique of Levinas the recent work of Bernhard Waldenfels, Bruchlinien der Erfahrung (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp 2002), pp. 141–143.Google Scholar
  12. 13.
    Cf. Martin Schnell, Phänomenologie des Politischen (Munich: Fink 1995), pp. 86 ff.Google Scholar
  13. 14.
    Jean-Luc Marion, In Excess. Studies in Saturated Phenomena, Robin Horner and Vincent Berraud (trans.) (Fordham University Press 2002), p. 37 (French original: De surcroît. Études sur les phénomènes saturés (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 2001), p. 44).Google Scholar
  14. 15.
    To approach Marc Richir’s innovative account, see e.g. his Méditations phénoménologiques (Grenoble: Millon 1992); Richir’s proceedings are continued by Laszlo Tengelyi, see his The Wild Region in Life-History, G. Kallay (trans.) (Evanston: Northwestern University Press 2003).Google Scholar
  15. 16.
    Cf. Jean-Luc Marion, Being given. Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness, Jeffrey L. Kosky (trans.) (Stanford: University Press 2002) (French original: Etant donné. Essai d’une phénoménologie de la donation. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1997).Google Scholar
  16. 17.
    Ibid., p. 266–7 (Etant donné, p. 367).Google Scholar
  17. 18.
    Jean-Luc Marion, In Excess, op. cit., pp. 46–49 (De surcroît, pp. 55–58). See Being Given, op. cit., pp. 268ff.Google Scholar
  18. 19.
    See on this point concerning the unseizable depth of self-affection, Jad Hatem, “Bewahrheitung und Sich-Erleiden,” in: Stefan Nowotny/ Michael Staudigl (eds.), Perspektiven des Lebensbegriffs. Randgänge der Phänomenologie, Hildesheim: Olms 2004, pp. 253–261.Google Scholar
  19. 20.
    E. Levinas, Time and the Other, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press 1987, p. 69 (Le temps et l’autre, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1983, pp. 55—56).Google Scholar
  20. 21.
    Jean-Luc Marion, In Excess, op. cit., p. 92 (De surcroît, p. 111).Google Scholar
  21. 22.
    Ibid., 90 (p. 109).Google Scholar
  22. 23.
    Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or beyond Essence, Alphonso Lingis (trans.) (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1981), pp. 51–2 (French original: Autrement qu’être ou au-delà de l’essence, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1978, pp. 66–67).Google Scholar
  23. 24.
    Ibid., p. 67 (p. 84).Google Scholar
  24. 25.
    Ibid., p. 51 (p. 65).Google Scholar
  25. 26.
    Cf. ibid., p. 53 (p. 68).Google Scholar
  26. 27.
    Ibid., p. 55 (p. 71).Google Scholar
  27. 28.
    Ibid., p. 109 (p. 139).Google Scholar
  28. 29.
  29. 30.
    Jean-Luc Marion, In Excess, op. cit., pp. 95–96 (De surcroît, p. 115).Google Scholar
  30. 31.
    Ibid., p. 96 (p. 115–116).Google Scholar
  31. 32.
    Being given, op. cit., p. 323 (Etant donné, p. 444); and finally Le phénomène érotique, Paris: Seuil 2003. The idea that the “logics of love” has to be understood with regard to the “logics of givenness,” can already be found in Marion’s earlier writings, especially in Dieu sans l’être and L’idole et la distance, where it was used to point at a transgression of the horizon of Being.Google Scholar
  32. 33.
    Such a reading of Levinas’ ethics is proposed by Laszlo Tengelyi, see his “Gesetz und Begehren in der Ethik von Levinas,” in: Iris Därmann and Bernhard Waldenfels (eds.), Der Anspruch des Anderen. Perspektiven phänomenologischer Ethik (Munich: Fink 1999), pp. 165–175.Google Scholar
  33. 34.
    To appeal to a givenness kath’exochen, which is the main interest of Marion’s idea of a “pure call,” but also to insistently rely upon an “u-topian” (cf. Autrement qu’être ou au-delà de l’essence, op. cit., p. 228) or “extra-territorial” dimension of the acting subject, respectively are but two expressions of the “great ontological law of love” (Sartre) which finally do not allow to take into account sufficiently the manifold other sides of “creative” human action.Google Scholar
  34. 35.
    Finally even to consider the “Gift of Death” (cf. Derrida, The Gift of Death, David Wills (trans.) (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press 1995)) masks too much the fact that it is life which is taken by this gift. It is — to stick to Derrida from a somewhat hyper-deconstructive point of view — an indifférance which seems to be at stake here.Google Scholar
  35. 36.
    Cf. I am the Truth. Toward a Philosophy of Christianity, Susan Emanuel (trans.) (Stanford: Stanford University Press 2002) (French original: C’est Moi la Vérité. Pour une philosophie du christianisme. Paris: Seuil 1996).Google Scholar
  36. 37.
    Cf. Marion, Being given, op. cit., p. 323 (Etant donné, p. 443).Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michael Staudigl
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute for Human SciencesVienna

Personalised recommendations