Abstract
This paper concerns interpretation and constitutive elements of understanding the world, both of which are treated in relation to the concept of force. Studies are criticized in which students’ conceptions are formulated, without further clarification, in terms of the word ‘force’. From such reports it can neither be concluded what students believe nor how their beliefs relate to science. Instead, reasons or criteria for applying ‘force’ need to be made explicit. Those reasons concern the effects that forces produce, namely deviations from an influence-free state; they also concern their sources, as made explicit in laws from which, for a given situation, the forces acting in it can be derived. The general concept of force, thus associated with the two-tier explanatory strategy of specifying (1) influence-free states and (2) force laws to account for deviations from those states, is a constitutive element of understanding the world. Within the constraints set by this explanatory strategy, the concept of force can still be variously applied, both in everyday and in scientific explanations. The differences between these various applications are partly anchored in distinct explanatory interest
Keywords
- Science Education
- Newtonian Mechanic
- Constitutive Element
- Planetary Motion
- Intuitive Theory
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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Klaassen, K. (2005). The Concept of Force as a Constitutive Element of Understanding the World. In: Boersma, K., Goedhart, M., de Jong, O., Eijkelhof, H. (eds) Research and the Quality of Science Education. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-3673-6_35
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-3673-6_35
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